




Overeducation, skills and wage penalty:  














The literature on educational mismatches finds that overeducated workers suffer a wage penalty compared 
with properly educated workers with the same level of education. Recent literature also suggests that 
individuals’ skill heterogeneity could explain wage differences between overeducated and properly 
matched workers. The hypothesis is that overeducated workers earn less due to their lower competences 
and skills in relative terms. However, that hypothesis has been rarely tested due to data limitations on 
individuals’ skills. The aim of this paper is to test the individuals’ skill heterogeneity theory in Spain using 
microdata from PIAAC, because it is one of the developed countries supporting the highest overeducation 
rates and where its adult population holds the lowest level of skills among a set of developed countries. Our 
hypothesis is that the wage penalty of overeducation in Spain is explained by the lower skill level of 
overeducated workers. The obtained evidence confirms this hypothesis but only to a certain extent as skills 
only explain partially the wage penalty of overeducation.  
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1. Introduction  
 
There is a remarkable consensus on the effects of educational mismatch on wages using the standard ORU 
specification (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981). On the one hand, undereducated workers benefit from a wage 
premium compared to well-educated workers with the same level of education. On the other hand, 
overeducated workers earn more than their properly educated co-workers, but earn less than they would at 
a job requiring their level of education. So, while undereducated workers earn more than their properly 
matched counterparts, overeducated workers experience a wage penalty. 
 One of the proposed theories to explain overeducation’s wage penalty is based on the assignment theory 
(Sattinger, 1993). It considers that workers’ productivity is limited by their job characteristics. So, 
overeducated workers may thus underutilize their skills, and, in consequence, they are less productive and 
obtain lower wages than well-educated workers with the same level of education. Following that idea, 
overeducation may imply overskilling. However, empirical evidence shows a weak correlation between 
both variables, which means that the assignment theory does not seem to be supported by data (Allen and 
van der Velden, 2001; Green and McIntosh, 2007).  
 A supported alternative theory is based on the existence of individuals’ skill heterogeneity. From such 
a perspective, the wage penalty associated to overeducation is due to the huge variation of skills between 
workers with the same level of education. Then, overeducated workers would not suffer a wage penalty. In 
fact, they would earn lower wages as a result of their lower skills. If this hypothesis holds, the wage penalty 
will disappear once individuals’ skill level is included in the analysis. However, most of the literature does 
not explicitly test this hypothesis due to data limitations regarding individuals’ skill levels.  
 In this paper we take advantage of the recently available database of the OECD Programme for the 
International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) because it includes information about individual 
skills from proficiency test’s scores. It allows testing whether individuals’ skill heterogeneity could explain 
the effects of educational mismatch on wages.  
 We focus on the Spanish case because it has some interesting features that justify the analysis. It is a 
developed country supporting one of the largest percentages of overeducated workers (OECD, 2013a; 
Morgado et al., 2015), a feature that was also observed before the current economic crisis (OECD, 2009; 
and Verhaest and van der Velden, 2013). At the same time, the Spanish population3 has one of the lowest 
levels of proficiency in literacy and numeracy skills (OECD, 2013a).  
 Therefore, the specific aims of the paper are twofold. First, to test whether the assignment theory is 
supported or not by the Spanish data. With this aim we will perform a statistical analysis of the correlation 
between both educational and skill mismatches and, second, to test the individuals’ skill heterogeneity 
theory in Spain. Our hypothesis is that the wage penalty associated to overeducation could be explained by 
their lower skill levels. In consequence, overeducated workers may not be suffering a wage penalty in 
Spain, but their earnings are determined by their skill level.  
 The obtained results show a weak correlation between educational and skill mismatches, as it is found 
in previous analyses. Thus, the assignment theory does not seem to be supported by Spanish data. We also 
find that individuals’ skill heterogeneity only explains 18% of the effect of educational mismatch on wages 
                                                          
3 Along with Italy (OECD, 2013a) 
in Spain. The wage penalty still remains for those overeducated workers who are not less skilled than 
properly matched workers. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, section 2 provides a literature review on the analysis 
of skills in educational mismatch. Section 3 introduces the PIAAC data and explains how educational and 
skills mismatch are measured. Section 4 shows the relationship between overeducation and overskilling. 
Section 5 quantifies the wage penalty of overeducation and the impact of skills using different 
specifications. Section 6 concludes with some final remarks. 
 
2 Literature review 
 
Different theories have been considered in order to explain the overeducation phenomenon (see Sloane, 
2006; McGuiness, 2006; Leuven and Oosberbeek, 2011 and Quintini, 2011 for a review). However, the 
most frequently regarded are the assignment model and individuals’ skills heterogeneity. 
 The assignment theory (Sattinger, 1993) makes the assumption that human capital returns depend on 
both the workers’ human capital and the match between the worker and the job. From such a perspective, 
workers’ productivity is limited by their job characteristics. So, overeducated workers may underutilize 
their skills and, in consequence, they are less productive and obtain lower wages than well-educated 
workers with the same level of education. Following that idea, overeducation may imply overskilling – or 
broadly speaking, educational mismatch may imply skill mismatch. 
 Thanks to the availability of recent databases providing questions relative to skill mismatch, the 
assignment theory has been explicitly tested. Skill mismatch has been measured by means of subjective 
workers’ responses about whether they consider that their skills are used enough in their jobs. Following 
the specification developed by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), different studies have included dummy 
variables for both educational and skill mismatch in the empirical analysis (Allen and van der Velden, 2001; 
Di Pietro and Urwin, 2006; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Mavromaras et al. 2013; Sánchez-Sánchez and 
McGuiness, 2015; Iriondo and Perez-Amaral, 2016; Pecoraro, 2016). It has been found that overeducation 
and overskilling have both a negative and statistically significant effect on earnings within the same level 
of education, the overeducation effect being much higher than the overskilling effect. This result underlines 
that wage penalization associated with overeducation is not explained by under-utilization or waste of 
workers’ skills, whereas the assignment theory is not supported by the results. They may suggest the 
existence of heterogeneity of workers’ skills. However, they do not explicitly test this theory due to a lack 
of information about workers’ skill level rather than skill mismatches.  
 Specifically, the heterogeneous skills theory takes into account human capital differences between 
workers. It considers that workers’ productivity depends on the human capital level acquired, regardless of 
job characteristics. Therefore, the observed wage differences among overeducated and undereducated 
workers compared to well-matched workers with the same educational level may only reflect individual 
differences in human capital within educational levels. In other words, overeducated workers may be less 
productive because they have less human capital, not because their job imposes limitations on their 
productivity.  
 As has been mentioned before, data availability on workers’ skill levels is very limited, whereas 
different approaches have been considered in empirical analysis to attempt to control for individual skill 
heterogeneity in the wage equation estimation.  
 One approach involves the consideration of panel data sets in order to control for all unobserved 
individual fixed effects (Bauer, 2002; Frenette, 2004; Korpi and Tåhlin, 2009; Tsai, 2010). They find that 
the wage penalty associated with being overeducated falls dramatically and even disappears when it is 
estimated by fixed effects, suggesting that (part of) the effect of educational mismatch is caused by 
unobserved individual ability. 
 Instead of using a longitudinal framework, Chevalier (2003) analyses cross-sectional data. He creates a 
proxy of workers’ unobserved productivity taking the difference between the estimated and the observed 
earnings in their first job. In this case, after accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity, the wage penalty 
for overeducation is slightly reduced. Using a similar methodology, Chevalier and Lindley (2009) arrive at 
analogous results. They construct a measure of unobserved ability as the residual from a first-job earnings 
equation, capturing all individual’s observed characteristics including job characteristics that affect wages. 
These residuals should then be a proxy for all time-invariant unobservable characteristics. Chevalier (2003) 
also introduces a new approach overlapping overeducation and workers’ job satisfaction. He divides 
overeducation into two categories: ‘apparent’ overeducation, composed of satisfied graduate workers; and 
‘genuine’ overeducation, consisting of dissatisfied graduate workers. Results show that ‘genuine’ 
overeducation brings a much larger pay penalty than ‘apparent’ overeducation.  
 Following this approach, Green and Zhu (2010) find similar results. They also consider different types 
of overeducation but use a direct measure of skills. Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) also include explicit indicators 
of ability in an analysis of Sweden using panel data, and the effect of overeducation on wages still remains 
statistically significant.  
 The recent study of Levels et al. (2013) also includes individuals’ skill level in the analysis using PIAAC 
data. They analyse the effect of workers’ skills level on the effect of educational mismatches derived from 
ORU specification for different OECD countries. They find that a considerable part of the effect of 
educational mismatches on wages can be attributed to skill heterogeneity, but it still remains statistically 
significant. 
 However, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and the International Adult Literacy 
Survey, Kleibrink (2016) analyses the causes behind the wage penalty observed for overeducated workers 
and he finds that this penalty is not due to unobserved productivity differences (although recognising that 
it is difficult to establish causal effects in this context). In summary, empirical evidence does not 
seem to support the assignment theory, given that there is a weak relation between educational and skill 
mismatches. The individuals’ skill heterogeneity theory seem to be the most supported explanation for the 
observed wage differences between overeducated and properly matched workers.  
 Although there is a wide literature analysing the impact of overeducation on wages in Spain (see Alba-
Ramírez, 1993; Murillo et al. 2012; Nieto and Ramos, 2013; Pascual-Saez et al., 2016; among others), to 
our knowledge, no extensive analysis has tested the role of individuals’ skill level on educational mismatch 
focusing on the Spanish case.  
  
 
3 Data sources and variable definition 
 
3.1 PIAAC database 
 
The Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) is a survey which has 
been conducted by the OECD. It assesses the proficiency of adults from age 16 onwards in literacy, 
numeracy and problem solving in technology-rich environments. In addition, the survey collects a range of 
information on reading, writing and numeracy-related activities of respondents, as well as education, labour 
and family background variables. It was conducted in 24 countries (22 OECD countries) between 2011 and 
2012.   
 Participation in the problem-solving domain was optional, and Spain (and other countries) did not 
participate in it. As a consequence, the competences we analyse are related to literacy and numeracy. 
Specifically, the two domains are defined in the following way: 
 
- Literacy: ability to understand, evaluate, use and engage with written texts to participate in society, 
to achieve one’s goals, and to develop one’s knowledge and potential. Literacy encompasses a 
range of skills from the decoding of written words and sentences to the comprehension, 
interpretation, and evaluation of complex texts.  
- Numeracy: ability to access, use, interpret and communicate mathematical information and ideas 
in order to engage in and manage the mathematical demands of a range of situations in adult life. 
To this end, numeracy involves managing a situation or solving a problem in a real context, by 
responding to mathematical content/ information/ideas represented in multiple ways. 
 
 Both literacy and numeracy are measured by 10 plausible values calculated using Item Response Theory 
(IRT), which are represented on a 500-point scale.  The idea is that each individual only responds to a 
limited number of items in the test. To avoid the assignation of missing values in those items which have 
not been included in the test, the procedure predicts scores using answers from the test and background 
questionnaires of similar individuals. It generates a distribution of values for each individual and their 
associated probabilities, with ten plausible values randomly obtained for each individual. This method 
prevents bias from estimating the result from a small number of test questions. We also consider the 
jackknife method (80 replicate weights) implemented in PIAAC to derive standard errors in wage 
regressions4.  
 Given the high correlation between literacy and numeracy skill level (0.92), we only perform the next 
analysis using literacy skills. However, we repeat the whole analysis using numeracy skills instead of 
literacy skills as a robustness check.  
 We consider two sets of variables. The first one includes variables related to workers’ human capital as 
years of education (derived from levels of education), experience, experience squared, non-formal 
education, and 10 plausible values test scores in literacy. The second one is composed of other personal, 
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job related and regional variables that are included in the model as controls5. These variables are gender, 
age, nationality, type of contract (full-time/part-time), contact term (temporary/permanent), sector 
(public/private), economic activity (industry, agriculture, construction, services, non-sale services) and 17 
regions. 
 The initial Spanish sample was composed of 6055 observations. We restrict the sample to employed 
workers who were not enrolled in education at the time. We drop from the analysis armed forces workers, 
and participants who did not give some of the information we need to perform the analysis. The final sample 
was 1928 observations. Table A.1 of the Appendix shows the descriptive analysis of the variables 
previously defined.  
 
3.2 Measuring educational and skill mismatches 
 
There are different methods to measure educational mismatch: the objective, the subjective or workers’ 
self-assessment and the statistical or realized matches. All of them have advantages and drawbacks, whereas 
using either measure method finally depends on the availability of the data (see Hartog, 2000; Verhaest and 
Omey, 2006 and Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011; for a review). 
 The PIAAC data allows us to measure required schooling using both the worker’s self-assessment and 
the statistical method.  
 
- The self-assessment method relies on questions that ask workers about the schooling requirements 
of their job. The PIAAC questionnaire specifically contains the following questions: “If applying 
today, what would be the usual qualifications, if any, that someone would need to get this type of 
job?”. Educational mismatch is obtained by comparing workers’ answers about required education 
and attained education. Workers are properly or well-matched when their attained education 
matches with their jobs’ required education. Conversely, overeducated (undereducated) workers 
have more (less) attained education than required by their jobs.    
- The statistical method (both mean and mode versions) uses information about workers’ schooling 
and their occupations. Regarding the mean version, the required amount of schooling for a worker 
is determined by the mean of attained education of all workers holding the same occupation. 
Workers are then defined to be overeducated or undereducated if their attained education deviates 
at least one standard deviation from the mean in their occupation. The mode version measure 
required schooling from the mode of attained education of all workers holding the same 
occupation. It classifies overeducated or undereducated workers according to whether their 
education differs from the mode in their occupation.  
 
 Table 1 shows the impact of educational mismatch in Spain using the self-assessment method. About 
half of workers in Spain have a proper match between their education and occupation. From the remaining 
workers, the PIAAC data highlights that overeducation is affecting 35.63%, 3.8 being the average number 
                                                          
5 The results for these control variables are not be discussed in the main text as we focus our comments in the variables 
of interest. Full details on the estimation results is available from the authors on request. 
of surplus years of education. On the other hand, undereducation concerns the other 15% and their average 
number of deficit years of education is 3.1. 6 7 
 
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
 The percentages obtained by the statistical method are shown in Table A.2 of the Appendix. It is worth 
noting that different measurement methods were used to report different percentages of educational 
mismatch, although they are considered to be the same country and the same database. However, the impact 
on wages is consistent regardless of the measurement method considered (Hartog, 2000). We perform the 
main analysis measuring educational mismatch using the self-assessment method, and we repeat it using 
the statistical method as a robustness check.  
 Regarding the measurement of skill mismatch, we follow the approach defined by the OECD using 
PIAAC data (Pellizzari and Fichen, 2013; OECD, 2013a). It is a combination of workers’ self-assessment 
questions and their skill proficiency score. The survey asks workers whether they feel they “have the skills 
to cope with more demanding duties than those they are required to perform in their current job” and 
whether they feel they “need further training in order to cope well with their present duties”. To compute 
the OECD measure of skills mismatch, workers are classified as well-skilled in a domain if their skill 
proficiency score in that domain is between the minimum and maximum score observed among workers 
who answered “no” to both questions in the same 1-digit occupation (and country). Workers are over-
skilled in a domain if their score is higher than the maximum score of self-reported well-skilled workers, 
and they are under-skilled in a domain if their score is lower than the minimum score of self-reported well-
skilled workers. Individual weighted results show that 72% of workers have a good match between their 
skills and those required by their jobs. Moreover, overskilling affects 21.4% of workers whereas 6.5% are 
underskilled.  
 
4 Are overeducated workers also overskilled?  
 
As it has been explained in the previous sections, individuals’ skill heterogeneity is one of the explanations 
of the fact that assignment theory does not seem to be supported by empirical evidence. In other words, 
most studies have usually found a weak correlation between overeducation and overskilling.  
 In this section, we analyse the correlation between both educational and skill mismatch (Table 2) to 
check whether the assignment theory is supported or not using data for Spain. We also compare the 
distribution of skills between different types of workers to find differences that could suggest the existence 
of individuals’ skill heterogeneity. 
 The PIAAC data for Spain shows that all workers have a higher probability of being well-skilled, 
regardless of their education-occupation (mis)match. In particular, we find that 72% of undereducated and 
70% of overeducated workers are well-skilled in their jobs. It is surprising that only 7.5% of undereducated 
                                                          
6 Although OECD (2013a) measures educational mismatch using the same self-assessment method than us, the 
percentages of mismatch are different. The reason of those differences is that they cluster education into 4 levels while 
we take advantage of the maximum level of disaggregation of the data.  
7 Similar incidence of educational mismatch in Spain has been found by Murillo et.al. (2012)  
workers are also underskilled and 20% have an excess of skills. However, the data shows that 23% of 
overeducated workers are also overskilled. This results is consistent with Allen and van der Velden (2001) 
and Green and McIntosh (2007). Indeed, the Pearson chi-square test formally validates the lack of 
correlation between educational and skill mismatch in Spain8. Thus, the empirical evidence for Spain does 
not seem to support the assignment theory, since educational mismatches are not associated to skill 
mismatches.  
 
TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
 Figure 1 shows the skill level of workers by educational mismatches and by different levels of education 
in order to provide preliminary evidence existence of skill heterogeneity between workers.  It shows that 
overeducated workers hold a lower skill level than properly educated workers with the same educational 
level. That fact is repeated for all educational levels (except for bachelor degree). However, undereducated 
workers tend to have a higher skill level than properly-educated workers with the same educational level 
(except for upper secondary education). Thus, the data show skill heterogeneity between workers with the 
same level of education. This fact could explain the wage differences between workers according to their 
education-occupation match. This is empirically tested in the following section. 
 
FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
5 Educational mismatch, skills and wages 
 
5.1 Empirical models  
 
In order to quantify the effect of educational mismatch on wages, different specifications based on the 
traditional wage equation (Mincer, 1974) have been proposed in the literature: the ORU specification 
developed by Duncan and Hoffman (1981) and the Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) specification. The 
traditional wage model considers formal education as a proxy of individuals’ human capital. However, it is 
well known that there are components of human capital such as skills or ability. We therefore also include 
individuals’ skills in all three models.  
 Specifically, the traditional wage equation is defined as follows: 
 
 log⁡(𝑊𝑖) = ⁡𝛼 + 𝛽⁡𝑆𝑖
𝑎 + 𝜃′𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (1a) 
 
where log⁡(𝑊𝑖) is the logarithm of the hourly wage of worker i; 𝑆𝑖
𝑎 refers to the number of years of formal 
education; 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables related to personal, job and regional characteristics that also 
includes other human capital variables such as experience, experience squared and a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the worker has participated in some non-formal education activity during the last 12 
                                                          
8  The Pearson chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis of non-correlation between variables. 
Pearson chi2(4) =  4.1182   p-value= 0.390. 
months prior to the survey and 0 otherwise. Finally, 𝑢𝑖 ⁡⁡is the error term with zero mean and constant 
variance.   
 Including the individuals’ proficiency skills (𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖), the modified model is then defined as: 
 
 log⁡(𝑊𝑖) = ⁡𝛼 + 𝛽⁡𝑆𝑖
𝑎 + 𝛾⁡𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 (1b) 
 
where 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖  is a continuous variable measured by scores in a 500-point scale. The higher the score is, the 
higher the individual’s skill level.   
 A variant of the traditional Mincerian wage equation is the ORU (Over-Required-Under-educated) 
specification created by Duncan and Hoffman (1981). This specification splits years of education (𝑆𝑎) into 
three variables: years of education required for the job (𝑆𝑟), years of overeducation (𝑆𝑜) and years of 
undereducation (𝑆𝑢). Specifically, it holds that ⁡𝑆𝑎 = 𝑆𝑟 + 𝑆𝑜 − 𝑆𝑢. In this sense, the following is 
determined:  
 
- 𝑆𝑜 = 𝑆𝑎 −⁡𝑆𝑟 if the worker is overeducated and 0 if otherwise, and  
- 𝑆𝑢 =⁡𝑆𝑟 − 𝑆𝑎 if the worker is undereducated and 0 if otherwise.  
 
 The ORU equation is then defined as: 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔⁡(𝑊𝑖) = ⁡𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖
𝑟 + 𝛽2⁡𝑆𝑖
𝑜 + 𝛽3⁡𝑆𝑖
𝑢 + 𝜃′𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 ⁡⁡ (2a) 
 
 The other variables’ definitions are the same as in specification (1a). The interpretation of the 
coefficients associated with over- and undereducation is compared with well-matched workers in the same 
job. The usual findings in the literature are 𝛽1 > 𝛽2 > |𝛽3|. 
 In order to test the individual’s skill heterogeneity hypothesis, we also include the variable related to 
individuals’ skills: 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔⁡(𝑊𝑖) = ⁡𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖
𝑟 + 𝛽2⁡𝑆𝑖
𝑜 + 𝛽3⁡𝑆𝑖
𝑢 + 𝛾𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜃
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 ⁡⁡ (2b) 
 
 The variable 𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖  is defined as in equation (1b). If individuals’ skills heterogeneity completely 
explains the wages’ effects of educational mismatch, we should get 𝛽1 = 𝛽3 = 0. If this is true, workers’ 
remuneration composed by their education and skills would be determined by the required education and 
their individual skill level.   
 Another contribution to the overeducation literature has been defined by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989, 
henceforth V&V). This model includes dummy variables related to overeducation and undereducation 
using the Mincerian wage equation. The V&V equation is defined as: 
 
 log⁡(Wi) = ⁡σ0 + σ1⁡Si
a + σ2⁡OEi + σ3⁡UEi + θ
′Xi + ui⁡⁡⁡ (3a) 
 
where OE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the worker is overeducated and 0 otherwise, and 
UE is also a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the worker is undereducated and 0 otherwise. The 
coefficients associated with both variables show the average wage effect of being overeducated and 
undereducated compared with well-matched workers with the same level of education. The usual finding 
is that overeducated workers have a wage penalization and undereducated workers benefit from a wage 
premium compared to well-matched workers with the same educational level. That is, 𝜎2 < 0 and 𝜎3 > 0. 
 We also extend that model including skill level variable. The extended V&V model is then defined as 
follows:  
 
 log⁡(𝑊𝑖) = ⁡σ0 + σ1⁡Si
a + σ2⁡OEi + σ3⁡UEi + 𝜌1𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖
𝑎 + 𝜃′𝑋𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 ⁡⁡⁡ (3b) 
 
In the case that the individual’s skills heterogeneity theory is valid, we expect that both coefficients 
associated with overeducation and undereducation are not statistically significant once we control for 




In line with similar studies (see, for instance, Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; and Di Prieto and Urwin, 2006), 
we control in all the previous specifications for a possible problem of sample selection bias estimating using 
Heckman two step specification (Heckman, 1979). This procedure takes into account the possibility that 
employed workers may not be a random subsample of the sample we are considering. The first step 
estimates the probability of being employed using a probit equation9 (see the results in Table A.3 of the 
Appendix). Then, the probit estimation is used to construct a selection bias control factor, which is included 
as an explanatory variable in the wage equation10.  
 As we focus on the analysis of the variables related to human capital, we only comment on the results 
of those variables in the main test. However, it is worth noting that the coefficients associated to control 
variables are similar to those in the previous literature. Furthermore, it is found that the lambda coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant for all specifications. Hence, the omission of the information about 
the probability of being employed in the wage analysis would imply a bias in the results. 
 Table 3 reports the results from the estimations of the Mincerian wage models specified in equations 
(1a) and (1b), the ORU models defined in equations (2a) and (2b) and the V&V specifications defined in 
equations (3a) and (3b).  
 
TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
                                                          
9 The probit equation of the probability of being employed includes as explanatory variables gender, experience, 
experience squared, years of attained education, immigrant status, number of children, whether individual is living with 
spouse or not, and regional dummies.  
10 The variables we use as exclusion restrictions are both number of children at home and whether individual is living 
with partner or not. Those variables affect the probability of being employed, but do not determine wages.  
 With respect to the traditional Mincer’s models, it is shown that the returns of the variables related to 
human capital are similar to previous literature findings (column 1). The return of attained education is 
6.4% per year. The years of experience in work also has a positive impact on wages, but there is a moment 
that its positive impact is decreasing. Finally, training activities in non-formal education also has a positive 
and significant effect on wages (13%).   
 When individuals’ skills are included in the model (column 2), we find a positive statistically significant 
effect on wages. Specifically, for each skill’s score, individuals have a return of 0.14%. The magnitude of 
the effect of skills may seem small, but it is important to remember that skills are measured by scores in a 
500-point scale. Furthermore, the coefficients of the other variables related to human capital (education, 
experience and non-formal education) are reduced once skills are included. 
 Regarding the ORU specification defined in equation (2a), we find that the return of required education 
is higher than the return of attained education. It points out the existence of educational mismatch. Contrary 
of most of literature, we find that the return of one year of overeducation is lower than the return (in absolute 
term) of one year of undereducation. In particular, overeducated workers obtain for each surplus year of 
education a 3% higher salary than well-educated workers in the same job. Undereducated workers obtain a 
3.7% lower wage than well-educated workers in the same job.  
 In order to test the individuals’ skill heterogeneity theory, individuals’ skills are included explicitly in 
the ORU model as specified in equation (2b). Skills have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
wages, but the effects of educational mismatch still remain statistically significant. Thus, for each year of 
required education, wage increases 7.45%. The coefficient related with years of overeducation falls from 
3% to 2.4% and the coefficient for years of undereducation decreases from 3.7% to 3.1%. Indeed, the 
hypothesis that years of overeducation and years of undereducation are both equal to 0 (ie. β2 = β3 = 0) after 
controlling for skill is rejected at a level of 1% significance. Hence, the obtained results show that 
individual’s skills heterogeneity explains only part of the wage effects of educational mismatch, and 
therefore our initial hypothesis about the Spanish case is not supported by the data. Specifically, skills only 
explain 18% of the wage’s effect of overeducation and 14% of the effect of undereducation on wages. The 
obtained results are in line with the analysis of Levels et al. (2013) for a set of OECD countries.  
 Finally, the results from V&V specifications defined in equations (3a) and (3b) are shown in the last 
columns of table 3. The effects of both dummy variables related to overeducation and undereducation are 
in line with previous literature. Overeducated workers suffer a wage penalization compared to well-
educated workers with the same level of education while undereducated workers earn higher wages than 
well-educated workers with the same level of education. Once individual’s skills are included in the model 
(equation 3b), the effects of educational mismatches are very slightly reduced. Specifically, the penalty 
associated with overeducated workers is reduced from 17.1% to 16.3%. On the other hand, the premium of 
undereducated workers falls from 13.1% to 12.4%. As  found in the results from the ORU specifications, 
these results do not seem to support the heterogeneity skills theory, since the effects of overeducation and 
undereducation still remain once skill is controlled for.  
 To sum up, we find that individuals’ skills are important to determine individuals’ wages as well as 
other human capital variables. However, contrary to our initial hypothesis, we do not find that individuals’ 
skills heterogeneity completely explains the effect of educational mismatch on wages. Specifically, the 
lower skills of overeducated workers only explain 18% of their lower wages compared to well-matched 
workers with the same level of education.  
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
 
The PIAAC data allows us to perform some robustness checks to validate the previous results.  
 First, literature shows that the incidence of both overeducation and undereducation could be different 
depending on the measurement method applied. However, the effects on wages are quite consistent 
regardless of the measurement method. Besides the self-assessment method, the PIAAC data allows us to 
measure educational mismatch by means of both versions of the statistical method, the mean and the mode. 
The results from the ORU specification measuring educational mismatch by means of both statistical 
methods confirm the main results (Table A.4. of the Appendix). Specifically, individuals’ skills only 
explain 14% of the wage penalty of overeducated workers in both models.   
 Second, we use the variable skill level in numeracy instead of skill level of literacy. As we have already 
notice, both variables are highly correlated, and therefore we decided not to include both together. We also 
estimate the ORU specifications including numeracy skills instead of literacy skills (Table A.5. of the 
Appendix). The results show that the wage penalty of overeducated workers is reduced but still remains 
once skills are included. Specifically, individual’s skills heterogeneity explains 22% of the wage penalty.    
 
6 Final remarks 
 
The main objective of this paper is to analyse whether individual’s skill heterogeneity explains the wage 
penalty of being overeducated in Spain. Our hypothesis is that the wage penalty associated with 
overeducation could be explained by the low skill level of overeducated workers, since Spain holds the 
lowest level of skill among its population. As a consequence, overeducated workers may not be suffering 
a wage penalty in Spain, and otherwise their earnings are determined by their skill level. Our results show 
that individuals’ skill heterogeneity only explains 18% of the effect of educational mismatch on wages in 
Spain. The wage penalty of overeducated workers still remains for those who are not less skilled than 
properly educated workers. However, it is important to take into account that our analysis has some 
limitations: first, we only focus on numerical and literacy skills but there are additional cognitive skills that 
could be relevant in the workplace such as problem-solving or computer skills and, second, skills could 
also be non-cognitive such as motivation or persistence. 
 There are some policy recommendations associated with the obtained results that are in line with recent 
literature (Levels et al, 2014 and Di Stasio et al, 2016). On the one hand, as part of the effect of 
overeducation on wages is due to a lack of competence or skills of overeducated workers, the different 
agents involved in educational policies should arrive at a consensus on defining the level of competence or 
skills that should be acquired at each level of education and implement it properly. Indeed, skills should be 
evaluated at educational institutions in the same way as educational outcomes are.   
 On the other hand, other measures should be taken into account by policy makers in Spain, since the 
wage penalty still remains after controlling for individual skills. First, educational institutions should give 
all the information about the employability of each type of education to students before they start a 
specialized course. Second, they should also encourage students in entrepreneurship. Self-employment 
could be a way to overcome the lack of demand for specific workers. Finally, the Spanish government 
should make an effort to promote a more intensive use of high-skilled professionals both in the public and 
private sector  - not only Information Technologies (IT) workers but also those in specialised personal 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Educational mismatch  
 Percentage Average mismatch in years of education   
Undereducation 15.17 3.10 (deficit) 
Proper education 49.20 0.00 
Overeducation 35.63 3.80 (surplus) 
Source: Own elaboration using PIAAC data. Individual sample weights have been considered. 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of undereducated, well-matched and overeducated workers 
by their skill (mis)match in literacy (in %) 
  Underskilling Proper skills Overskilling Total 
Undereducation 7.48 72.24 20.28 100.00 
Proper education 6.52 73.18 20.29 100.00 
Overeducation 6.02 70.62 23.36 100.00 
Source: Own elaboration using PIAAC data. Individual sample weights have been considered.    
 
Table 3. Estimated earnings functions  
Variable 
Mincer ORU V&V 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) 
Male 0.208*** 0.189*** 0.193*** 0.179*** 0.195*** 0.180*** 
 [0.0224] [0.0186] [0.0218] [0.0185] [0.0219] [0.0178] 
Immigrant -0.108*** -0.0728** -0.0728** -0.0471 -0.0840** -0.0550 
 [0.0357] [0.0355] [0.0350] [0.0339] [0.0355] [0.0347] 
Attained education (years) 0.0617*** 0.0529***   0.0706*** 0.0627*** 
 [0.00509] [0.00482]   [0.00504] [0.00494] 
Required education (years)   0.0715*** 0.0642***   
   [0.00530] [0.00517]   
Overeducation (years)   0.0295*** 0.0243***   
   [0.00657] [0.00597]   
Undereducation (years)   -0.0361*** -0.0310***   
   [0.00919] [0.00831]   
Overeducation (dummy)     -0.158*** -0.151*** 
     [0.0211] [0.0207] 
Undereducation (dummy)     0.123*** 0.117*** 
     [0.0309] [0.0253] 
Skill level (scores)  0.00144***  0.00111***  0.00122*** 
  [0.000291]  [0.000293]  [0.000292] 
Experience 0.0170*** 0.0165*** 0.0172*** 0.0168*** 0.0170*** 0.0166*** 
 [0.00393] [0.00389] [0.00389] [0.00383] [0.00381] [0.00385] 
Experience squared -0.000206** -0.000173** -0.000246*** -0.000218*** -0.000236*** -0.000207** 
 [8.40e-05] [8.45e-05] [8.20e-05] [8.12e-05] [8.15e-05] [8.19e-05] 
Non-formal education 0.128*** 0.120*** 0.0974*** 0.0934*** 0.103*** 0.0984*** 
 [0.0220] [0.0204] [0.0213] [0.0198] [0.0214] [0.0202] 
Full-time -0.0379 -0.0307 -0.0512 -0.0449 -0.0520 -0.0452 
 [0.0352] [0.0350] [0.0350] [0.0359] [0.0348] [0.0358] 
Permanent 0.106*** 0.0995*** 0.0907*** 0.0869*** 0.0896*** 0.0852*** 
 [0.0265] [0.0280] [0.0261] [0.0276] [0.0260] [0.0272] 
Public sector 0.135*** 0.137*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.150*** 0.150*** 
 [0.0355] [0.0376] [0.0337] [0.0355] [0.0338] [0.0349] 
Lambda 0.115** 0.116*** 0.0871* 0.0896** 0.0968** 0.0986*** 
 [0.0512] [0.0396] [0.0526] [0.0406] [0.0487] [0.0377] 
Constant 0.677*** 0.442*** 0.692*** 0.511*** 0.681*** 0.483*** 
 [0.149] [0.123] [0.150] [0.125] [0.143] [0.120] 
Activity sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1928 1928 1928 1928 1928 1928 
R-squared 0.392 0.404 0.432 0.438 0.425 0.432 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p-value<0.10. ** p-value<0.05. *** p-value<0.01. Individual sample weights considered. Equations 
(1b), (2b) and (3b) take into account the 10 plausible values of skill level and the 80 replications weights. Test statistics for β2 = β3 = 0 
in model 2b is 23.35***. 
 
 
Figure 1: Average skills levels of workers by educational level. 
 






Table A.1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log(wage) 2.18 0.50 0.18 4.53 
Literacy proficiency 260.07 42.87 78.76 367.19 
Numeracy proficiency 256.71 44.50 82.32 380.86 
Age 41.32 10.08 16 65 
Male 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Immigrant 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Attained education  12.21 3.43 6 21 
Experience  18.45 10.66 0 55 
Experience squared  453.88 470.44 0 3025 
Non-formal education  0.56 0.50 0 1 
Full time job 0.85 0.36 0 1 
Permanent contract 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Public sector 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Agriculture  0.04 0.19 0 1 
Construct 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Services 0.47 0.50 0 1 
No-sale services 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Source: PIAAC. Individual sample weights considered. Number of observations 1928. 
 
 
Table A.2. Educational mismatch using the statistical method.  
 Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
MODE     
Overeducation 0.3516185 0.4775994 0 1 
Proper education 0.3975564 0.4895198 0 1 
Undereducation 0.2508252 0.4336005 0 1 
Years of overeducation 3.3781 1.771671 1 11 
Years of undereducation 3.599314 1.629411 1 11 
MEAN     
Overeducation 0.1409579 0.3480684 0 1 
Proper education 0.6873661 0.4636868 0 1 
Undereducation 0.171676 0.3771964 0 1 
Years of overeducation 1.30805 1.07916 0.0111046 4.856499 
Years of undereducation 1.429313 1.103022 0.1687933 6.62323 
Source: Own elaboration using PIAAC data. Individual sample weights considered. 
 






Experience squared -0.00109*** 
 [0.000155] 




Number of children -0.0674*** 
 [0.0247] 




Regional dummies Yes 
Observations 4689 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p-value<0.10. ** p-value<0.05. *** p-value<0.01. Individual 




Table A.4. Estimated earnings ORU functions measuring educational mismatch by means of the 
statistical method (mode and mean). 
Variable 
MODE MEAN 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 
Male 0.202*** 0.187*** 0.209*** 0.193*** 
 [0.0216] [0.0181] [0.0212] [0.0181] 
Immigrant -0.0765** -0.0488 -0.0626* -0.0362 
 [0.0352] [0.0348] [0.0350] [0.0336] 
Required education (years) 0.0823*** 0.0741*** 0.0977*** 0.0884*** 
 [0.00550] [0.00547] [0.00602] [0.00630] 
Overeducation (years) 0.0431*** 0.0369*** 0.0720*** 0.0618*** 
 [0.00662] [0.00657] [0.0168] [0.0158] 
Undereducation (years) -0.0393*** -0.0330*** -0.0799*** -0.0690*** 
 [0.00767] [0.00714] [0.0141] [0.0142] 
Skill level (scores)  0.00118***  0.00123*** 
  [0.000284]  [0.000281] 
Experience 0.0161*** 0.0157*** 0.0148*** 0.0147*** 
 [0.00382] [0.00384] [0.00340] [0.00363] 
Experience squared -0.000214*** -0.000187** -0.000211*** -0.000186** 
 [8.17e-05] [8.40e-05] [7.77e-05] [8.16e-05] 
Non-formal education 0.102*** 0.0976*** 0.0978*** 0.0928*** 
 [0.0220] [0.0208] [0.0224] [0.0212] 
Full-time -0.0365 -0.0307 -0.0397 -0.0334 
 [0.0340] [0.0350] [0.0342] [0.0360] 
Permanent 0.101*** 0.0964*** 0.105*** 0.0985*** 
 [0.0255] [0.0273] [0.0252] [0.0255] 
Public sector 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 
 [0.0348] [0.0362] [0.0350] [0.0365] 
Lambda  0.0793 0.0819** 0.0496 0.0610** 
 [0.0511] [0.0400] [0.0306] [0.0264] 
Constant 0.492*** 0.309** 0.379*** 0.183* 
 [0.147] [0.120] [0.123] [0.111] 
Activity sector Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1928 1928 1928 1928 
R-squared 0.429 0.437 0.429 0.438 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p-value<0.10. ** p-value<0.05. *** p-value<0.01. Individual sample weights 
considered. Column s (1b) and (2b) also take into account the 10 plausible values of skill level and the 80 
replications weights in both estimations.  
  
 
Table A.5. Estimated earnings ORU functions using numeracy skills 
Variable (1a) (1b) 
Male 0.193*** 0.169*** 
 [0.0218] [0.0190] 
Immigrant -0.0728** -0.0424 
 [0.0350] [0.0336] 
Required education (years) 0.0715*** 0.0624*** 
 [0.00530] [0.00539] 
Overeducation (years) 0.0295*** 0.0231*** 
 [0.00657] [0.00603] 
Undereducation (years) -0.0361*** -0.0310*** 
 [0.00919] [0.00830] 
Skill level (scores)  0.00131*** 
  [0.000299] 
Experience 0.0172*** 0.0163*** 
 [0.00389] [0.00386] 
Experience squared -0.000246*** -0.000205** 
 [8.20e-05] [8.19e-05] 
Non-formal education 0.0974*** 0.0906*** 
 [0.0213] [0.0195] 
Full-time -0.0512 -0.0420 
 [0.0350] [0.0360] 
Permanent 0.0907*** 0.0840*** 
 [0.0261] [0.0277] 
Public sector 0.151*** 0.150*** 
 [0.0337] [0.0354] 
Lambda 0.0871* 0.0908** 
 [0.0526] [0.0412] 
Constant 0.692*** 0.497*** 
 [0.150] [0.123] 
Activity sector Yes Yes 
Regions Yes Yes 
Observations 1928 1928 
R-squared 0.432 0.441 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p-value<0.10. ** p-value<0.05. *** p-value<0.01. 
Individual sample weights considered. Column (1b) also takes into account the 10 
plausible values of skill level and the 80 replications weights in both estimations.  
 
 
